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Case No. 7735 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
NORTHCREST, INC., a corporation, 
Plaintiff and A:ppellantJ 
-vs.-
WALKER BANK & TRUST COM-
pANY, a corporation, as executor 
of the last will and testament and 
estate ·of LUCIE R. THOMAS, who 
was sometimes known as L. R. 
THOMAS, deceased, JOHN LIV-
INGSTON THOMAS and ADEL-
AIDE R. THOMAS, his wife; and 
GERTRUDE THOMAS GARD-
NER, 
Defendants and Resp,donents, 
HUGH L. THOMAS, JR., unmar-
ried; WALTER WRIGHT; and 
H. C. BROWNLEE, Trustee, 
Defendants. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
MORETON, CHRISTENSEN & 
CHRISTENSEN 
Attorneys for Respondents. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
NORTHCREST, I~C., a corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.-
"TALKER BAXK & TRUST CO~I­
PAXY, a corporation, as executor 
of the last will and testament and 
estate of LUCIE R. THOMAS, who 
was sometimes known as L. R. 
THO~IAS, deceased, JOHN LIV-
INGSTON THO~IAS and ADEL-
AIDE R. THOMAS, his wife; and 
GERTRUDE THO~IAS GARD-
NER, 
Defendants and Respdonents, 
HUGH L. THOMAS, JR., unmar-
ried; \V ALTER WRIGHT; and 
H. C. BROWNLEE, Trustee, 
Defendants. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEniENT OF FACTS 
A. Preliminary Statement 
Case No. 
7735 
The brief of appellant does not fully reflect 
all of the essential facts of this case, and for that reason 
we deem it necessary to set forth a statement of facts 
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In full. "'\Ve cannot hope to match the brief of the ap-
pellant in dramatic appeal, but we shall attempt to com-
pensate for this deficiency with a straightforward com-
prehensive and unvarnished recital of all of the relevant 
facts of the case. 
This action was brought by the plaintiff to quiet 
its title to two quarter-quarters sections of land described 
as follows: 
The Northwest quarter of the Southeast quarter 
and the ~ ortheast quarter of the Southwest 
quarter of Section 29, Township 1 North, Range 
1 East, Salt Lake Meridian. (R. 1, 2). 
Plaintiff's exhibit "A" well illustrates the lands 
involved. 
For purposes of this law suit, it is necessary to 
treat the lands in question as three separate tracts by 
reason of the fact that plaintiff's claims to the various 
tracts do not all arise out of the same chains of title. 
The first tract is the Northwest quarter of the South-
east quarter of Section 29, and will hereinafter be re-
ferred to as the East 40. The second tract consists of 
the Northeast quarter of the Southwest quarter, except 
a strip about 20 rods north and south by 30 rods east 
and west, in the southwest corner thereof. The second 
tract will be hereinafter referred to as the west tract. 
The third tract is the small southwest corner of the 
west tract above described, and is hereinafter referred 
to as Capitol Heights Second Filing. 
Capitol Heights Second Filing is subdivided into 
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Lots and Blocks. Certain of these lots were never owned 
by any of the defendants and the plaintiff's title thereto 
is not in dispute. These lots a.re known and designated 
as Lots 1 to 8 inclusive, Block 1, Lots 2 to 7, inclusive 
and Lots 15 to 21 inclusive, Block ~' and Lots 2 to 6 
inclusive and Lots 15 to 21 inclusive, Block 2, and Lots 
2 to 6 inclusive and Lots 15 to 21 inclusive in Block 3, 
Capitol Heights Second Filing. (R. 106, 107). On plain-
tiff's Exhibit ~-\_, these lots are shown in white. They 
are referred to in appellant's brief as the "white lots" 
and we shall employ the same terminology. The other 
lots in Capitol Heights Second Filing a.re shown on 
Exhibit A in yellow, and in these lots the respondents 
claim an interest. We shall follow appellant's termjn-
ology and refer to these lots as the "yellow lots." 
The Court's Decree quieted plaintiff's title in and 
to the white lots, and to an undivided one-third interest 
in and to all of the rest of the property in suit, subject 
to the probate of the estate of Lucie R. Thomas, de-
ceased. The Court also quieted the title of defendant 
John Livingston Thomas to an undivided one-third 
interest and the title of the defendant Gertrude Thomas 
Gardner to an undivided one-third interest each to all 
of the lands in suit except the white lots, subject to the 
probate of the Estate of Lucie R. Thomas, deceased. 
(R. 113-115). Appellant now concedes that the Court 
was correct in awarding to each of John Livingston 
Thomas and Gertrude Thomas Gardner, an undivided 
one-third interest in the yellow lots, but contends that 
it "·as error to award those defendants any interest in 
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the b8.lanc8 of the property, and claims that plaintiff 
should have been awarded title to the whole thereof. 
(A:ppellant's brief, pp. 46, 50). 
In view of the fact that title to the white lots is 
not in anywise involved in this appeal, they may be 
eliminated from further consideration, and hereinafter 
in this brief, any reference to the land in suit will be 
understood to exclude the white lots. 
B. CHRONOLOGY 
All parties to this action derive their claims of 
title from Lucie R. Thomas. (R. 27). It is undisputed 
that on and before December 16, 1908, LucieR. Thomas 
was the owner in fee of all of the lands in suit. (Ex. 
11). On that date she executed a Warranty Deed to 
H. H. Hempstead of San Francisco to the west tract. 
The deed was subsequently recorded, not at the request 
of the grantee, Hempstead, but at the request of the 
grantor, Lucie R. Thomas, (Ex. F.) and Hempstead 
never thereafter asserted any dominion ·over the land. 
Notwithstanding the deed to Hempstead, Lucie 
Thomas continued to treat the land as her own. On 
February 4, 1910, she executed a Warranty Deed to 
Tracy Loan & Trust Company covering b,oth the East 
40 and also the west tract. (Ex. 11, Entry 38). The land 
was subsequently reconveyed to Lucie Thomas by Tracy 
Loan & Trust Company on September 17, 1915. (Ex. 
11, Entry 44). The west tract was sold for delinquent 
taxes assessed against Hempstead for the years 1910 
and 1911, but was redeemed by Lucie Thomas on Jan-
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uary 10, 1915. (Ex. 11, Entries 40 and 42). On January 
18, 191~, both the East 40 and the \rest tract \vere sold 
to Spencer Clawson by ~\uditor's Tax Deed. (Ex. 11, 
Entry 43). On January 1~, 1914, Lucie Thomas and her 
husband, Hugh (not to be confused with defendant 
Hugh L. Thomas, Jr., Lucie's son), executed to Utah 
SaYings and Trust Company, hereinafter referred to 
as Utah Sa,ings, an instrument in the form of a War-
ranty Deed describing the east 40 and the west tract, 
but excluding Capitol Heights, Second filing. (Ex. 11, 
Entry 47; Ex. D). On January 19, 1915, Spencer Claw-
son, Quit Claimed to Lucie Thomas all of his interest 
in and to the east 40 acres and the west tract. (Ex. 11, 
Entry 49). K otwithstanding the deeds to Hempstead, 
Tracy Loan & Trust Co., and Utah Savings, Lucie 
Thomas always treated the land as her own. From 
the years 1918 through 1934 inclusive, Lucie Thomas 
paid the taxes on all of the lands in suit. The lands 
were sold for taxes assessed for the years 1935 and 
1936 and were later redeemed by Lucie Thomas. From 
1938 through 1945 inclusive, Lucie Thomas again paid 
all of the taxes on the lands in suit. (R. 100, 101). On 
July 31, 1918, Lucie Thomas obtained a. Certificate of 
\Yater Appropriation from the State Engineer for 
use of water on part of the lands in suit. The certifi-
cate of water appropriation recites that the date of 
appropriation was January 13, 1909. (Ex. 11, Entry 
52-53). 
Willard R. Smith, a stockholder and director of 
the plaintiff corporation and its treasurer, testified 
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that in the summer of 1947, the plaintiff corporation 
became interested in purchasing the lands in suit, hav-
ing previously purchased adjacent lands. The plain-
tiff obtained an abstract of title to the lands in suit 
and determined that Lucie R. Thomas was the owner 
(R. 68, 69). On August 13, 1947, plaintiff wrote a 
letter to Lucie Thomas who was then in Southport 
Connecticut inquiring whether she was interested in 
selling the lands. (R. 69, 79, 80; Ex. 9). Mrs. Thomas 
never replied to the letter, but shortly thereafter, Hugh 
L. Thomas, Jr., called on Mr. Smith and represented 
that he was Lucie's son. (R. 70). Negotiations for 
:purchase of the property commenced. (R. 70). North-
crest referred the matter to its attorneys for an opinion 
and they advised that title to the lands in suit was in 
either Lucie R. Thomas or Hugh L. Thomas, (the wit-
ness wasn't certain which), but advised that the title 
was clouded by the record interests of Utah Savings 
and Hempstead under the deeds hereinbefore described. 
(R. 71). As a result of the negotiations between North-
crest and Hugh L. Thomas, Jr., N orthcrest agreed to 
purchase the lands in suit from Hugh L. Thomas, Jr. 
for the sum of $2500.00, which was the full value of 
the property. (R. 73). Hugh L. Thomas Jr. was paid 
$1800.00 of the purchase price and the balance of $700.00 
was withheld pending clearance of the title. (R. 74, 
76). Pursuant to that agreement, Mr. Smith arranged 
to obtain a Quit Claim Deed to the lands in suit from 
Utah Savings. At that time he \Yas advised by the 
officers of Utah Savings, with whom he negotiated, 
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that Utah Savings claimed no interest whatsoever in 
the lands. (R. 72, 73). No consideration "·as given for 
the execution of the Quit Claim Deed (R. 75). Smith 
did not expect to obtain any title by virtue of the Quit 
Claim Deed, but merely to clear the cloud. Likewise, 
the interest of Hempstead in the premises was recog-
nized by both Hugh L. Thomas, Jr., and by Smith, as 
merely a cloud. (R. 75). 
Lucie Thomas died on or about July 5, 1948, leav-
ing as her surviving heirs and devisees the defendants 
John Livingston Thomas, Gertrude Thomas Gardner 
and Hugh L. Thomas, Jr. (Ex. 6). Prior to this date 
and on or about September 16, 1947, an instrument was 
executed purporting to be a Warranty Deed from Lucie 
R. Thomas to Hugh L. Thomas, Jr., covering all of the 
lands in suit. (Ex. B; Ex. 11, Entry 67). At the trial 
the defendants produced evidence so overwhelmingly 
strong that the signature on this deed was not that 
of Lucie R. Thomas, that plaintiff now reluctantly, but 
none the less effectually concedes that this signature 
was not hers. Appellant does, however, contend that 
this signature was adopted by Lucie and acknowledged 
by her, notwithstanding that there is no evidence to 
support the contention. On June 11, 1948, Hugh L. 
Thomas, Jr. executed to the plaintiff a Warranty Deed 
covering all the lands in suit. (Ex. 11, Entry 59; Ex. 
C.). On December 16, 1947, plaintiff obtained from 
Utah Savings a Quit Claim Deed to all the lands in suit, 
except the yellow lots in Capitol Heights Second Filing. 
(Ex. E; Ex. 11, Entry 64). Plaintiff later obtained a 
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Quit Claim Deed fro.m Lucie Hempstead, the widow of 
H. H. Hempstead, deceased, and also obtained a decree 
quieting its title to the west tract as against the widow 
and the personal representative of H. H. Hempstead. 
The details of this transaction are more fully stated 
hereafter. 
Plaintiff's claims to tile to the lands in suit are 
based upon three separate chains of title. Plaintiff 
claims first, an undivided fee title to the east 40 acres 
and to the west tract, and an undivided one-third in-
terest in the yellow lots in Capitol Heights Second 
Filing, by virtue of its Warranty Deed from Hugh L. 
Thomas, Jr. Second, plaintiff claims title to the east 
40 acres and to the west tract under its Quit Claim 
Deed from Utah Savings; and third, plaintiff claims 
title to the west tract under its Quit Claim Deed from 
Lucie Hempstead 'and under its decree quieting title 
to said tract of land as against Lucie S. Hempstead 
and against the personal representative· of the Estate 
of H. H. Hempstead, deceased. We shall treat these 
separate claims seriatim. 
C. PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM UNDER HUGH 
L. THOMAS, JR. 
The validity of :plaintiff's claim under its deed 
fro.m Hugh L. Thomas, Jr., depends upon the validity 
of the purported deed from Lucie R. Thomas to Hugh 
L. Thomas, Jr., dated Sept. 16, 1947, and covering all 
of the 1ands in suit. If this purported deed was a valid 
conveyance to Hugh L. Thomas, Jr., then the claim of 
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the plaintiff is valid and it is entitled to a deeree quiet-
ing its title to all of the lands in suit. If, howeYer, the 
purported deed from Lucie Thomas to Hugh L. Thomas, 
Jr., was not a Yalid eonyeyance, but \Yas a forgery, ~as 
claimed by the respondents, then the claim of the plain-
tiff is without merit and the only interest which plain-
tiff would have obtained under its deed from Hugh L. 
Thomas, Jr., would be an undivided one-third interest 
in the lands in suit, subject to the probate of the estate 
of Lucie R. Thomas, deceased. 
· It is interesting to observe that the plaintiff in 
its brief admits that it obtained only an undivided one-
third interest in ·and to the yellow lots. It would seem 
to follow as a necessary consequence, that if the plain-
tiff obtained only an undivided one-third interest in 
and to the yellow lots, it obtained no greater interest 
in the rest of the lands in suit. All of the lands in suit 
are described both in the purported deed from Lucie 
Thomas to Hugh L. Thomas, Jr., and also in the deed 
from Hugh L. Thomas, Jr., to the plaintiff. We do not 
know upon what possible theory it could be contended 
that the plaintiff derived any greater interest in the 
east 40 acres and in the west tract, than it obtained in 
the yellow lots. Having admitted that it acquired only 
a one-third interest in the yellow lots, plaintiff would 
seem to have admitted that it obtained no greater inter-
est in the rest of the lands in suit. This alone would be 
sufficient to defeat plaintiff's claim under Hugh L. 
Thomas, Jr. However, the evidence received at the 
trial of the case conclusively shows the purported deed 
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fr01:1 Lucie R. Thomas, to Hugh L. Thomas, Jr., to be 
a forgery and therefore to be wholly nugatory. 
It is now admitted that the signature on the deed 
from Lucie Thomas to Hugh L. Thomas, Jr., was not 
the signature ·of Lucie Thomas. The evidence is equally 
clear that this signature was never acknowledged or 
adopted by Lucie Thomas as her own. Marguerite B. 
Clayton, the notary public, who purportedly took the 
acknowledgment of Lucie R. Thomas on the deed, testi-
fied at the trial that Lucie Thomas did not appear 
before her, either on the date shown on the deed or at 
any other time, and did not acknowledge the signature 
to be hers. (R. 59, 60). The defendant Hugh L. Thomas, 
Jr. (who defaulted), was subpoenaed to testify on be-
half of the respondents and he testified that his mother, 
Lucie Thomas was never in Salt Lake City in 1947, 
except during the latter part of December of that year, 
and therefore, could not have acknowledged the sig-
nature on the deed. He stood upon his constitutional 
privilege against self incrimination and refused to an-
swer any further questions. (R. 81). 
D. PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM UNDER UTAH 
SAVINGS & TRUST COMPANY 
Mr. McGee, an officer of Utah Savings was called 
and testified on behalf of the respondents. The testi-
mony of McGee is produced in full in appellant's brief 
and need not be repeated here. The purpose of call-
ing McGee was to identify the defendants' Exhibit 8, 
which is a series of three loan cards, part of the records 
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of Ftah Savings. The cards, together with Mr. McGee's 
explanation thereof, show conclusively that on January 
12, 1914, Lucie Thomas and her husband borrowed from 
Utah Savings the sum of $1400.00. The cards also show 
that the loan, together "ith interest thereon was fully 
repaid on K ovember 3, 1915. Exhibit 8 also shows that 
the borrowers, Lucie Thomas and her husband, Hugh, 
executed a 'Yarranty Deed as security for the loan. On 
the loan card the deed is merely described as W.D. 
['Yarranty Deed] to part of Section 29, Township 1 
North, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Meridian. The vV ar-
ranty Deed from Lucie Thomas and her husband Hugh 
to Utah Savings and Trust Co., under which plaintiff 
claims title to the east 40 ~acres, and the west tract, is 
dated January 12, 1914, which is the same date as the 
loan. The consideration recited in the deed is $1400.00, 
which is the exact amount of the loan. 
As above pointed out, the property was never there-
after claimed by Utah Savings, but was always claimed 
by Lucie R. Thomas and treated as her own. No other 
deed from Lucie Thomas to Utah Savings covering any 
other lands in Section 29, was ever recorded. (R. 101). 
In light of these facts and circumstances, the con-
clusion is irresistable that this purported Warranty 
Deed was not a deed at all, but was intended by both 
of the parties thereto to be a mortgage and security for 
the loan, and was treated by both as such. 
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E. PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM UNDER 
H. H. HEMPSTEAD 
Plaintiff also claims title to the west tract by vir-
tue of a Quit Claim Deed from Lucie S. Hempstead, the 
widow of H. H. Hemrpstead, deceased, (Ex. G) and by 
virtue of a decree quieting its title in and to the west 
tract, as against Lucie S. Hempstead and 'as against 
Arthur P. Lakin, administrator with the will annexed of 
the Estate of H. H. Hempstead, deceased. (Ex. H). 
The quiet title suit against the Hempsteads was orig-
inally commenced on November 7, 1950, (after com-
mencement of the case at bar) and Lucie Hempstead 
was the sole defendant. The complaint alleged that title 
to the premises was in the plaintiff, that the defendant 
claimed some interest in and to the lands adverse to 
the plain tiff and that such claim was null and void. 
The complaint was signed by Frank Armstrong one 
of the attorneys for the plaintiff, and by signing the 
complaint he certified that in his opinion there were 
good grounds to support the allegations therein con-
tained. Rule 11, U.R.C.P. Subsequently on about No-
vember 29, 1950, the plaintiff obtained a Quit Claim 
Deed from Lucie Hempstead to the west tract for which 
it paid a consideration of $25.00. Thereafter, the at-
torneys for the plaintiff procured the appointment of 
Arthur P. Lakin as administrator with the will annexed 
of H. H. Hempstead, deceased, and they amended their 
complaint in the quiet title suit by joining the personal 
representative of H. H. Hempstead as a party defend-
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ant. (Ex. 10). Thus the attorneys for N orthcrest rep-
resented both the plaintiff, N orthcrest and the defend-
ant representatiYe of the Estate of H. H. Hempstead, 
and assun1edly on their adYice the personal representa-
tiYe of the Hempstead estate defaulted. 
It should be obserYed here, that if plaintiff is in 
·good faith when it states that it would be \villing to 
rely on its title derived from Utah Savings (as it does 
state at page 6 of its brief), it can hardly be in good 
faith in asserting that it obtained a good title from the 
Hempsteads. The claim under Utah Savings as to the 
west tract, could not have any validity, if there is any 
merit to the Hempstead claim, since the Hempstead 
deed antedates the deed to Utah Savings. 
Both Hempstead and Lucie Thomas being dead 
at the time of the trial it was impossible to show the 
exact nature of the transaction between Lucie Thomas 
and H. H. Hempstead. However, from the fact that 
the deed was recorded by Lucie Thomas, the grantor, 
rather than by Hempstead, the grantee, (who was a 
resident of San Francisco), and from the fact that 
Hempstead never thereafter asserted any interest in 
the land and from the fact that Lucie Thomas con-
tinued to treat the land as her own, it is almost nec-
essary to infer that the deed from Lucie R. Thomas to 
Hempstead was never intended to convey :any bene-
ficial interest in the land. In any event, if Hempstead 
ever obtained any title to the west tract, such title was 
suh:-:f•quently extinguished by virtue of the Auditor's 
Tax Deed of the west tract to Spencer Clawson. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
14 
F. SU:MMARY 
In summary, it may be said that Lucie Thomas 
was the owner of all of the lands in suit prior to 1908 
and at that time she executed a Warranty Deed to H. 
H. Hempstead to a portion of the lands in suit, that 
such deed probably never conveyed any title to Hemp-
stead but if it did so, such title was later extinguished 
by an Auditor's Tax Deed to Spencer Clawson, cov-
ering the same lands; that on January 12, 1914, Lucie 
Thomas executed an instrument in the form of a War-
ranty Deed to Utah Savings, covering the East 40 acres 
and the West tract, but said instrument was never in-
tended as a conveyance, but merely as a mortgage; that 
the loan secured thereby was later fully paid and sat-
isfied and that on the payment of such loan, Utah Sav-
ings never had any further interest in the land and 
never claimed any; that thereafter Lucie Thomas was 
the sole owner of said lands and continued as such to 
the date of her death, paying all of the taxes thereon; 
that the purported deed from Lucie Thomas to Hugh 
L. Thomas, Jr., was a forgery and was of no force or 
effect whatsoever; that the plaintiff, N orthcrest, dealt 
with Hugh Thomas Jr., in good faith, believing that 
Hugh Thomas, Jr. had the title to the land; that the 
plaintiff, N orthcrest knew that the interests of both 
Hempstead and Utah Savings were merely clouds and 
treated them as such; that the Quit Claim Deed obtained 
by the plaintiff from Utah Savings was not in deroga-
tion of the Thomas title, but in affirmation thereof; 
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that the plaintiff having discovered that it had been 
defrauded and that it obtained no title whatsover to 
the lands in suit, except whatever interest Hugh might 
have had by right of inheritance from his mother, has 
sought by various devices to throY{ its loss upon the 
defendants, John Livingston Thomas and Gertrude 
Thomas Gardner, both of whom are entirely innocent 
of any wrongdoing in the matter and who in equity and 
good conscience should not be deprived of their rights 
of inheritance by reason of the wrongdoing of a third 
person with whom they never dealt. 
POINTS TO BE ARGUED 
1. The respondents established by evidence which 
was clear, convincing and unequivocal that the deed 
from Lucie R. Thomas to Utah Savings & Trust Com-
pany was intended as a mortgage. 
:2. The evidence by Utah Savings & Trust Com-
pany that the deed from LucieR. Thomas to Utah Sav-
ings & Trust Company was intended as a mortgage 
was competent and relevant and was properly received 
by the Court. 
3. The testimony of the notary public denying 
that Lucie R. Thomas acknowledged the purported deed 
from Lucie R. Thomas to Hugh L. Thomas, Jr., was 
competent and relevant and was properly received by 
the Court. 
4. Respondents proved by a clear preponderance 
of the evidence that the purported deed from Lucie R. 
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Thomas to Hugh L. Thomas, Jr., was a forgery and 
said instrument was nutagory and void and of no force 
and effect. 
5. Plaintiff's claim to title under H. H. Hempstead 
is wholly without merit. 
6. Plaintiff's claims to title under H. H. Hemp-
stead and Utah Savings & Trust Company were ob-
tained in affirmation and not in derogation of the 
Thomas title and the plaintiff is estopped to claim title 
under either. 
7. Lucie Thomas established a title by adverse 
possession, good as against the claims of either H. H. 
Hempstead or Utah Savings & Trust Co. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE RESPONDENTS ESTABLISHED BY EVIDENCE 
WHICH WAS CLEAR, CONVINCING AND UNEQUIVOCAL 
THAT THE DEED FROM LUCIE R. THOMAS TO UTAH 
SAVINGS & TRUST COMPANY WAS INTENDED AS A 
MORTGAGE. 
Appellant commences its argument with the asser-
tion that it would be willing to stand on its title ob-
tained under its Quit Claim Deed from Utah Savings. 
This bold assertion fails to ring true in view of the fact 
that appellant devotes a considerable portion of its 
brief in attempting to uphold its position under two 
other chains of title. While we can well understand 
why appellant would not place much faith in its claims 
under Hugh L. Thomas, Jr., and H. H. Hempstead, its 
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claim under Utah Savings is equally frail and must 
fall when confronted with cold facts and clear reasoning. 
Appellant concedes, as well it must, that a deed ab-
solute on its face may be shown to be intended only as 
a mortgage, and we assume that appellant also con-
cedes that when such a showing is made, courts of 
equity ·will give effect to the intent of the parties and 
treat the jnstrument as a mortgage. The cases cited 
in app€llant 's brief are ample authority for this prop-
osition. 
We agree with the appellant's statement that the 
question in every case is the intention of the parties, 
and ·we have no quarrel with the proposition that the 
mutual intentio:o. of the parties must be proved. 
The evidence outlined in our Statement of Facts 
clearly shows the intention of both parties, that 
is of Lucie R. Thomas and her husband, Hugh Thomas 
on the one hand, and Utah Savings on the other, that 
the instrument executed by the Thomases to Utah Sav-
ings in the form of a Warranty Deed was intended by 
both of the parties thereto as a security transaction 
only, and that it was treated by both parties as such. 
It is apparently the position of the appellant that this 
intent of the parties can be shown only by conversa-
tions of the parties at the time of the execution of the 
instrument. However, the law of evidence is not so 
:poverty stricken. In determining the intent of the 
parties, and whether or not a mortgage was intended, 
the Court may and should consider the existence of a 
continuing obligation to pay a debt; relative values; 
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contmnporaneous and subsequent acts and declarations 
of the parties to the instrument; the form of written 
evidence of the transactions; the relationship of the 
parties, and the purposes to be accomplished. Corey 
vs. Roberts, 82 Utah 445, 25 Pac. (2d) 940; Thornley 
Land and Livestock Co. vs. Gailey, (Utah), 143 Pac. 
(2d) 283, 
The record quite conclusively establishes that there 
was an existing and continuing obligation on the part 
of the Thomases to pay a debt to Utah Savings which 
was evidenced by the loan cards of the bank. It fully 
appears from the testimony of E. R. McGee set forth 
in full in appellant's brief, and from Exhibit 8, part of 
the records of Utah Savings, that prior to January 12, 
1914, the Thomases borrowed money from Utah Sav-
ings, that a portion of this loan was repaid, and that 
on January 12, 1914, an additional amount was bor-
rowed, making the total amount of the obligation 
$1400.00. The date of this transaction is identical to 
the date of the Warranty Deed from the Thomases to 
Utah Savings, and the consideration recited in the deed 
is $1400.00, the exact amount of the loan. Further, the 
records of the bank show that a Warranty Deed cov-
ering part of the lands in Section 29, was executed by 
the Thomases, as security for the loan. While the bank 
records do not S'Pecifically identify the land covered in 
the security deed, as being the same identical lands as 
those described in the deed under which appellant 
claims, there would seem to be little doubt that the 
lands referred to were the same. The identity of date 
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and consideration can hardly be charged to coincidence. 
:Moreover, it appears from the abstract of title received 
in evidence, that Lucie R. Thomas thereafter continued 
to treat the land as her own, mortgaging it, conveying 
it, paying the taxes thereon and securing a certificate 
of water appropriation . 
..:-\fter the amount of the indebtedness was paid, 
Utah Savings never asserted any further interest in 
the land. At the time of its Quit Claim Deed to the 
appellant, Utah Savings admitted that it claimed no 
interest in the land. 
In view of all these facts and circumstances, the 
conclusion is irresistable that it was the intent of both 
parties that the deed should be treated as a mortgage, 
and both parties did in fact treat the deed as a mortgage. 
Counsel for the appellant has suggested no other con-
clusion which would be consistent with all of the above 
mentioned facts and circumstances and we are unable 
to conceive of any. Counsel has suggested that the 
Thomases might have executed another Warranty Deed 
conveying other lands in Section 29, as security for the 
loan transaction, and counsel specifically suggests that 
Lucie Thomas owned the yellow lots in Section 29 as 
well as the lands described in Exhibit D. The record 
does not show when Lucie Thomas acquired title to the 
yellow lots and it would be mere speculation to assume 
that she was the owner of those lots or any other lands 
in Section 29 at the time of this conveyance. It would 
be even more speculative ·to assume that Lucie Thomas 
executed two deeds to Utah Savings. The record is 
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clear that only one deed was ever recorded, and there 
is no evidence whatsoever, that even suggests that an-
other deed was executed by Lucie Thomas to Utah 
Savings. The finding of the Court must be based on 
evidence, not upon speculation and conjecture. There 
is no evidence to support appellant's thesis. The trial 
Court arrived at the only conclusion possible under the 
evidence adduced. 
POINT II. 
THE EVIDENCE BY UTAH SAVINGS & TRUST COM-
PANY THAT THE DEED FROM LUCIE R. THOMAS TO 
UTAH SAVINGS & TRUST COMPANY WAS INTENDED 
AS A MORTGAGE WAS COMPETENT AND RELEVANT 
AND WAS PROPERLY RECEIVED BY THE COURT. 
Plaintiff contends that it was incompetent for Mr. 
:McGee to testify with respect to the records of Utah 
Savings. This contention seems to be based upon a 
false premise. Appellant cites the general rule that a 
grantor may not, after parting with his title, make 
statements or admissions in disparagement of his title 
to the prejudice of his grantee. No such problem is 
here involved. It was not contended by respondents 
that McGee knew of his own personal knowledge the 
facts with respect to the deed from the Thomases to 
Utah Savings. Mr. McGee, as an officer of Utah Sav-
ings, having access to its records, was called merely to 
identify the records and to explain the notations thereon. 
The records speak from the date they bear and not from 
the date of trial, and were properly received as state-
ments in disparagement of its title by a grantor made 
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at a time when it was vested with whatever interest 
it ever held, and long prior to the time it 1parted with 
its title. The rule with respect to such declarations is 
well stated in the annotation in 1 A.L.R. at page 1240 
where it is said: 
"The well-settled rule of la'IY is that the dec-
larations against his own title of a former owner 
of property, either real or personal, made while 
in the possession thereof, are admissable not 
only against himself, but also against those claim-
ing u.nder him, but that a derogatory statement 
of a grantor made after parting with title, being 
hearsay, and not having the required guaranty 
of truth, is not competent evidence against the 
transferee, or those claiming under him, at least, 
in the absence of fraud or collusion." (Italics 
ours.) 
See also the statement of the rule in 20 Am. J ur. pages 
502, 503 and 516, Evidence, Sees. 593, 593.1 and 604: 
Page 502, Sec. 593 : 
"The declarations of a third per'Son are ad-
missable against a party whenever privity of 
estate exists between the declarant and the party, 
the term 'privity of estate' generally denoting 
in this respect a succession in rights. The dec-
larations of the privity in estate are deemed in 
law to be the declar·ations of the party himself. 
Thus, whenever a party claims under, or in the 
interest or right of, another, the de~larations of 
such other person pertaining to the subject of 
the claim are admissible against him.'' 
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Page 503, Sec. 593.1 : 
"It should be observed that the st·atements 
of :parties to an instrument at and after the 
execution thereof are admissable where the is-
sue is whether the instrument was an absolute 
deed or mortgage.'' 
Page 516, Sec. 604: 
"On the other hand, it is held that whenever 
·a party clai1ns under or in the interest or right 
of another, the declarations of such other person 
pertaining to the subject of the claim are admis-
sible against him. Accordingly, a declaration of 
a former owner in the nature of an .admission 
against interest, is, as to real estate at least, 
admissible against his successors in title to show 
the real char·acter of the possession of the dec-
larant or the title under which he held, provided 
the matter is one which may be proved by parol 
evidence and the declarant posessed a proprietary 
interest at the time he made the statement. It is 
not necess-ary to call the former owner as a wit-
ness to prove the statement; and any person 
may testify thereto.'' 
See also Abbott v. Walker, 204 Mass. 71, 90 N.E. 
406. 
Not only were these records of Utah Savings prop-
erly received as admissions against interest of a former 
owner, binding upon his privity, (appellant), but they 
were also admissible as records made in the regular 
course of business of Utah Savings. The rule with re-
spect to this is well stated in 20 Am. Jur. 881, Evidence 
Sec. 1403, follows: 
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book rule of the common law and statute, which 
admits only the account books of a party to a 
cause or proceeding, is ·another rule which is not 
confined to books of account or to records made 
by a party to an action, under \Yhich entries cr 
memoranda n1ade by third parties in the regular 
course of business, under circumstances calcu-
lated to insure accuracy and precluding any mo-
tive of misrepresentation, are admissible as rprima 
facie evidence of the facts stated. The truth-
telling habits of such business records make them 
admissible, irrespective of the unavailability of 
the witness. ~Iodern statutes of recent develop-
ment have provided for ~admissibility of certain 
business books and memoranda.'' 
The documents were also admissible under still 
another rule that is, the ancient document rule, these 
records having been in existence for more than 30 years. 
Only by keeping the true facts from the Court can 
appellant hope to prevail. To its credit, it must be said, 
that it has exercised real ingenuity in attempting to 
devise arguments and to raise obstructions to the pre-
sentation of the full facts to the Court. However, trials 
of law suits being essentially factual investigations, 
it is the policy of the law to receive in :proof all evidence 
which reasonably tends to prove or disprove the ulti-
mate facts in issue, except as such evidence is declared 
to be inadmissible under one of the well established 
exclusionary rules. Appellant has pointed to no ex-
clusionary rule \vhich would n1ake the testimony of 
McGee or Exhibit 8 inadmissible. The false issue of 
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disparaging declarations being made after the grantor 
has parted with interest is patently without merit and 
the evidence of McGee is entitled to be weighed and 
considered the same as that of any other disinterested 
witness. 
POINT III. 
THE TESTIMONY OF THE NOTARY PUBLIC DENY-
ING THAT LUCIE R. THOMAS ACKNOWLEDGED THE 
PURPORTED DEED FROM LUCIE R. THOMAS TO HUGH 
L. THOMAS, JR., WAS COMPETENT AND RELEVANT 
AND WAS PROPERLY RECEIVED BY THE COURT. 
In seeking to establish its title under Hugh L. 
Thomas, Jr., the plaintiff is again confronted with the 
necessity of supressing the facts, and only by so doing 
can it hope to prevail upon this theory. It has always 
been the contention of the respondents, that the deed 
from Lucie R. Thomas to Hugh L. Thomas, Jr., was a 
forgery. It is elementary of course, that a forged deed 
is utterly void and conveys nothing to the grantee al-
though he may be an innocent purchaser for value and 
without notice of the forgery. Long Co. v. Kenwood 85 
Ut. 524, 39 Pac. (2d) 1088, and cases there cited; also 
16 Am. Jur. 452. 
At the trial of this cause, respondents produced 
such overwhelming evidence that the signature upon 
the deed was not that of Lucie R. Thomas, that appel-
lant now ·belatedly and reluctantly concedes that the sig-
nature on the deed is not hers. However, appeUant has 
the temerity to assert that the notary's certificate of 
acknowledgment stands as strong evidence that Lucie 
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Thomas acknowledg-ed the deed as her own a.ct, and that 
it was incompetent for the notary public to impeach her 
certificate of acknowledgment. In making this conten-
tion, appellant seeks to give to the certificate of ac-
knowledgment a degree of sanctity far above that to 
which it is entitled. 
"\Vhile asserting that the weight of authority is to 
the effect that a notary may not impeach his certificate 
of acknowledgment, appellant cites only two cases in 
support of its position and both of those cases are read-
ily distinguishable from the facts in the case at bar, 
as will be more fully pointed out, hereafter. 
Appellant has failed to recognize that there are two 
types of fact situations which may occur and which are 
controlled by different legal principles. In the first 
situation the person purporting to execute the deed or 
other instrument, may actually be in the physical pres~ 
ence of the Notary Public, but may not make a valid 
acknmYledgment, due to physical infirmity, mental in-
capacity, ignorance, or failure of the notary to follow 
the forms prescribed by the law. In situations of this 
sort, many of the Courts hold not only that the notary 
may not impeach his certificate, but that the certficate 
is absolutely conclusive of the facts therein stated. 
HmYeYer, in the second class of cases, where the per-
son purporting to execute the deed or instrument never 
appears before the notary public at all, the authorities 
are virtually unanimous in holding that the purported 
certificate of acknowledgment is a nullity and has no 
force or effect whatsoever and may be impeached by 
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parol evidence. It has been held in a great num·ber of 
cases that the officer taking the acknowledgment may 
testify in impeachment of his own certificate, and the 
trend of authority and the better reasoning is in sup-
port of this view. 
For an excellent discussion of the foregoing views 
see Grider vs. American Freehold Land Mort~age Co. 
99 Ala. 281, 12 So. 775, where it is said: 
"It must be regarded as settled by the great 
weight of authority that when the grantor or 
mortgagor appe·ars before the officer and makes 
an acknowledgment of the execution of the in-
strument, which is duly certified by the officer 
to have been made in conformity to law, the 
.certificate is conclusive of the truth of all the 
facts therein certified, and which the officer was 
by law authorized to certify, until successfully 
as·s·ailed for duress or fraud in which the grantee 
or mortgagee participated, or of which he had 
notice at the time of parting with the considera-
tion. The taking and certifying of the acknowl-
edgment are held in many of the cases to be of 
a judidal nature; and when the officer has juris-
diction so to speak, by having the party acknowl-
edging, and the instrument to be acknowledged 
before him, and enters upon and exercises this 
jurisdiction, the parties will not be allowed to 
impeach the truth of the facts which he is re-
quired by law to certify, and does certify, in the 
·absence of fraud or duress, as above stated. 
* * * 
'' ... we must realize that the question we are 
called upon to decide is by no means free from 
difficulty. We know the absolute and implicit 
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faith and trust ·which, in practice, purchasers 
of real estate repose, and must necessarily re-
pose, in the form,al and regular certificates of 
authorized officers, authenticating the regular 
and legal execution of conveyances, and the dis-
astrous consequences which may flow from a 
rule which would allow those certificates to be 
questioned, and set aside ,against vurchasers who 
have parted with valuable interests in reliance 
upon them ; yet on the other hand we perceive 
the manifest injustice of a rule which would de-
prive one- of his property, without his knowl-
edge or consent, upon the mere baseless fabrica-
tion of another ... Upon due consideration, we 
are of the opinion that the better rule, and the 
one sustained by the weight of authority is that 
when there has been no appearance before the 
officer, and no a1cknowledgment at all made, it 
may be shown in disproof of the officer's certifi-
cate, even against bona fide mortg·agees and 
purchasers. We approve the rule as it is stated in 
1 American & English Enc. Law. P 160 1T 6: 
'When there is no appearance before the of-
ficer, his false certificate of acknowledgment is 
void; but when there is an appearance and ac-
knowldegment of it in some manner, then the 
official certificate is conclusive of every fact 
appearing on its face, and evidence of what 
passed at the time of the acknowledgment is in-
admissible to impeach the certificate, except in 
case of fraud or imposition, and where knowl-
edge or notice of the fraud or imposition is 
brought home to the grantee.'" (Italics ours). 
Another excellent discussion is set forth in the 
case of Pickens vs. Knisely, 29 W. Va. 1, 11 S. E. 932. 
The Court there said: 
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"In all the cases the struggle has been to 
protect the married woman in her right of prop-
erty on the one hand, and the innocent purchaser, 
who parted with his money for her land, on the 
other, and to uphold the rights of land owners, 
who must necessarily rely on the correctness of 
the records of land-titles for their protection 
... it has been uniformly held that, as regards 
an innocent purchaser of the land of a married 
woman, the certificate of her acknowledgment 
of the deed by an authorized officer is conclu-
sive of the facts which are therein stated. The 
principle, it is contended, applies to every case 
where the acknowledgment has been certified 
by an officer authorized to take it, whether the 
married woman ever acknowledged it or not. 
But I have found no case where it has been held 
that if it cleal'ly appeared, by 1l·roper parol evi-
dence, that the married woman never, in fact, 
appeared before the officer to acknowledge the 
deed, :and the certificate contains all the require-
ments of the law, just as though she had in fact 
appeared before the officer, the deed would op-
erate to devest [sic] her estate, even in favor of 
an innocent purchaser; but we have cited two 
cases where :lt has been held that under such 
circumstances her estate could not be devested 
[sic]. It does seem to me that strong as may be 
the claims of innocent purchasers, who have been 
thus impnsed upon by the gross fraud and col-
lusion of a wicked husband rand a justice, who 
had no regard for the rights of property, yet the 
claim of an innocent wife, who, without the least 
fault of hers, has thus been the victim of such an 
attempted spoliation of her land, makes a much 
stronger appeal to the Court. 
* * 
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'·It seen1s to us that it is adn1issible to hear 
the evidence of a justice who took the acknowl-
edgment of a married woman to prove that she 
neYer did in fact appear before him to acknowl-
edge a deed, although he has certified that she 
did.,, 
See also the language of the Supreme Court of 
Arkansas in the case of Hall vs. Mitchell, 175 Ark. 
641, 1 S.,V. (2d) 59 where the court said: 
''A :proper acknowledgment is an es·sential 
part of the execution of a conveyance of land, 
and it is competent for the grantor to show the 
falsity of a certificate of acknowledgment. Where 
the grantor does not acknowledge the deed and 
the officer makes a certificate that the grantor 
did appear, the act of the officer is without au-
thority of law and void. No one can claim that an 
estate in land can be divested by forgery, and 
every one must be subject to the risk of forgery 
by officers authorized to take acknowledgments. 
Miles v. Jerry holds in accord with above and 
further holds that forgery need only be proved 
by a preponderance of the evidence. Miles v. 
Jerry, 158 Ark. 314, 250 S.W. 34 and Wilson v. 
Biles, 171 Ark. 912, 287 S.W. 373." 
The rule is summarized in 41 L.R.A. (N.S.) at 
pages 1170 and 1171 as follows: 
"Even in those states where the certificate 
is held to be conclusive of every fact appearing 
on the face of the certificate which the officer is 
by law authorized to certify, ·and where it is held 
that evidence of what passed at the time of the 
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acknowledgment is inadmissible to impeach the 
certificate except in case of fraud or imposition, 
the certificate may always ·be impeached by proof 
that the party did not in fact appear before the 
officer certifying to the acknowledgment, nor 
otherwise acknowlege the instrument. Michener 
v. Cavender, 38 Pa. 334, 80 Am. Dec. 486; Le Mes-
nager v. Hamilton, 101 Cal. 532, 40 Am. St. Rep. 
81, 35 · Pac. 1054; Grider v. American Freehold 
Land Mortg. Co. 99 Ala. 281, 42 Am. St. Rep. 58, 
12 So. 775; Meyer v. Gossett 38 Ark. 377; Wheel-
ock v. Cavitt, 91 Tex. 579, 66 Am. St. Rep. 920, 
45 S.W. 796; Johnston v. Wallace, 53 Miss. 321, 
24 Am. Rep. '699. '' 
And at page 1173 of the same annotation it is said: 
"But it is always admissible to show that 
grantors in alleged deeds or mortgages never 
actually appeared before the officer purporting 
to have taken their acknowledgments, and that 
they made no acknowledgment at all, even as 
against a bona fide purchaser or mortgagee with-
out notice, and relying on the acknowledgment. 
This situation is analogous to a judgment void 
for want of jurisdiction. There is a wide dis-
tinction between this and the admission of an 
appearance before the officer, but a denial of 
the occurrence of certain rna terial incidents re-
cited in the certificate.'' 
For other authorities to the same effect see Donahue 
vs. Mills, 41 Ark. 421; Peoples Gas Co. vs. Fletcher, 81 
Kan. 76, 105 Pac. 34, Robertson vs. Burnham, (Tex.) 
12 S.W. (2d) 991; and Moore vs. Bragg 212 Ala. 481, 
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103 So. 45:2; See also 1 An1. J ur. 378, where the rule is 
declared as follows : 
"On the other hand, it shocks the conscience 
to suppose that property owners may be de-
frauded merely by false personation or by pro-
curing the collusion of an unscrupulous officer. 
A balancing of the conveniences leads to the con-
clusion tlzat where there was no appearance be-
fore the officer and no acknowledgment at all 
made, this may be shown in disproof of the cer-
tificate, even against innocent persons who have 
relied upon the recitals thereof. There is a wide 
distinction between this and the admission of 
an a;ppearance before the officer, but a denial of 
the occurrence of the material incidents recited 
in the certificate. In the 1atter class of cases it 
is generally held that the recitals in the certifi-
cate can only be impeached for fraud or imposi-
tion, and then only if the knowledge or notice of 
the fraud can be brought home to the grantee. 
The rights of property are too sacred to ~allow 
them to be swept away without the knowledge 
of the owner. Furthermore, caveat emptor.'' 
(Italics ours.) 
Utah is committed to the above rule. In the case 
of Tarpey vs. Desert Salt Co., (Utah) 14 Pac. 338, this 
court said: 
"A deed may be acknowledged and admitted 
to record. One object of the acknowledgment is 
to entitle the deed to be recorded. But the record 
is only prima fa·cie evidence of t:he faiCts therein 
stated. Law Utah 1884 p. 363, sees. 1177, 1178. 
The certificate of acknowledgment is itself only 
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prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. 
It is not conclusive, amd may be rebutted. Comp. 
Law Ut~ah, p. 255, sec. 9, (625). Further proof 
may become necessary in support of the cer-
tificate, or to show its falsity." (Italics ours). 
Though appellant asserts that the weight of author-
ity does not permit a notary or certifying officer to im-
peach his certificate, most of the c.ases which we have 
been able to discover on this question have permitted 
the certifying officer to impeach his certificate. The 
trend of authority is definitely in this direction. See 
1 Am. Jur. 380 where it is said: 
"The trend of authority, however, is in favor 
of admitting any evidence that may have a tend-
ency to prove the truth, and a more liberal rule 
permits the officer to be called as a witness and 
compelled under oath to state the true facts of 
the transaction so far as he can remember them, 
whether he acted under mistake, misapprehen-
sion, or in collusion with the party to be bene-
fited by taking the acknowledgment.'' 
The only two cases cited by appellant, (First Na-
tional Bank v. Glenn. 10 Ida.. 224, 77 P. 623 and Wood-
ridge v. Woodridge (W. V a.) 72 S.E. 654), do not sup-
port the rule for which appellant contends. In both of 
those cases it was clear that the party purporting to 
have executed the acknou·ledgment did in fact appear 
before the officer, whereas in the case at bar, the testi-
mony is that Lucie R. Thomas never did appear before 
Mrs. Clayton to acknowledge the deed. The courts held, 
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in those two cases, that it was not competent for the 
notary to impeach his certificate. In the case of the 
First K a tl. Bank of Hailey v. Glenn, supra, (quoted 
in appellant's brief at page 34) the language which pur-
ports to support the appellant's position is merely dicta. 
In that case the notary actually testified in support 
of his certificate. The language was unnecessary to the 
holding of the court and should not be persuasive on 
this court. \Ye quote the following language from that 
case: 
"In this case, however, the evidence of the 
notary was as much in support of the certificate 
as in contradiction thereof. He testified to ex-
plaining to the witness the contents of the in-
strument, and its purpose :and effect, and that, 
while she did not appear to understand it very 
well, she told him it was all right with her if it 
was with her husband, and that whatver he did 
or said was all right with her. He also testified 
that after going over the matter, making a full 
explanation as he could, and conversing with her 
about it, he considered she had m~ade a sufficient 
acknowledgment of the execution of the instru-
ment and that she was satisfied therewith, and 
that he felt justified in attaching the certificate 
of acknowledgment thereto.'' 
We quote below from a few of the many decisions 
which have authorized the courts to receive the testi-
mony of the officer in impeachment of his certificate of 
acknowledgment. 
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Qualls vs. Qualls, 196 Ala. 524, 72 So. 76: 
"Neither public policy nor other rule of our 
court would prevent the witness Searcy [notary] 
in a controversy between the parties to the pur-
ported deed to deny its execution, to explain the 
presence of his affixed seal of office, and cer-
tificate of acknowledgment, and to state the true 
facts, in a court of justice, when such a reputed 
conveyance is collaterally attacked.'' 
Garth v. Fort, 15 Lea (83 Tenn.) 683: 
''. . . any evidence going to show a want of 
the invalidity of the privy examination is com-
petent, and we know of no rule excusing an of-
ficer from stating such facts as will go to show 
a failure on his part to do his duty.'' 
Louden v. Blythe, 16 Pa. 532: 
''The justice who takes and certifies the ac-
knowledgment of the wife to a deed is acting 
judicially ... We cannot cast into oblivion our 
knowledge that this duty is often, by justices of 
the peace, :and sometimes by other judicial offi-
cers, as has been said, 'hurried over almost in 
the presence of the husband.' 
''Can it be that such acknowledgments are of 
so high and sacred a character as to import ab-
solute verity, and cannot be assailed by parol 
evidence 1 '' 
Camp v. Carpenter, 52 Mich. 375, 18 N.W. 113: 
''In the present case, when the notary swore 
he did not know the person whom he certified 
he knew, he deprived his certificate of all the 
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fo'u.ndation on 1rhich the la1c allows the presump-
tion to be raised, and the subscribing witness 
who testified to his own ignorance destroyed 
also the presun1ption that in some cases attend 
the action of such witness in the absence of sus-
picion. It would be very absurd to allow a cer-
tificate such zceigllt a.s is claimed for it here when 
the notary himself contradicts his own state-
ments and shows its want of truth. It is not a 
very satisfactory state of things when a forgery 
can gain even presumptive credit from the ex-
amination of an officer who has certified, with-
out foundation for his action." (Italics ours). 
Campbell vs. Campbell, (Wash.) 263 Pac. 957: 
"As we indicated in Ehlers v. United States 
Fid. & Guar. Co., supra, the act of the officer 
in certifying to the acknowledgment may result 
in taking the property of one person and vesting 
it in another, and that such an officer, no matter 
how prudent he is, may be deceived. It would 
seem necessarily to follow, therefore, that the 
person wronged by such an act should not be de-
prived of any testimony which would tend to 
correct the wrong, and it can be that the testi-
mony of the officer taking the acknowldegment 
would be the most persuasive testimony that could 
be produced upon the fa~t. The weight that is 
to be given to his testimony will of course de-
pend upon the circumstances, but the triers of 
the fact in such an instance, as in all other in-
stances of controverted fact, must be relied upon 
to give the testimony its due weight. The reason 
usually given for excluding the testimony of the 
officer, is that it is contrary to public policy. 
But to us this is a mistaken view. If the question 
rests upon this ground, it must be because the 
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certificate is conclusive, and none of the cases, 
even those that adhere most tenanciously to the 
rule of disqualification, goes to this extent." 
(Italics ours). 
Mays vs. Pryce, et al, 95 Mo. 603, 8 S. W. 731: 
''The notary who was most conversant with 
the facts recited in his certificate, was of all 
persons the most competent to testify on that 
subject, whether in support or in impeachment 
of the verity of its statements. The only rule 
that could possibly close his mouth as a witness 
would be one making this certificate absolutely 
conclusive, one that would preclude him or any-
body else from calling in question the verity of 
that certificate. In the argument of the learned 
counsel for the plaintiff, much is said in support 
of the proposition that such ought to be the 
rule, but it having been long settled the other 
way, it must follow from the rule as now estab-
lished that the notary is as competent as any 
other witness to testify touching his knowledge 
of the facts recited in the certificate, the verity 
of which under that rule is a legitimate subject 
of inquiry; a corollary recognized in the cases 
cited, supra, in nearly all of which the notary 
testified, sometimes in support of, and sometimes 
in impeachment of, his certificate and his com-
petency was never questioned. There ·was no 
error in admitting the testimony of the notary.'' 
For other cases to the same effect see Fisher vs. 
Bollman, 258 Ill., App. 461; McDowell vs. Stewart, 83 
Ill. 538; :McCurley v. Pitner, 65 Ill. App. 17; Comings 
vs. Leedy, 114 Mo. 454, 21 S.\Y. 804; Truman vs. Lore, 
14 Ohio State, 144; Jackson vs. Humphry 1 Johns, 
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(X.Y.) 498: Kranichfelt Y~. Slattery, 12 l\fisc. 96, 33 
X.Y.S. :27: \Yinn Y~. Itzel, 123 \Yis. 19, 103 N.W. 220; 
DaYis YS. :J[onroe, 187 Pa. St. 334; Roach vs. Francisco, 
138 Tenn. 337,197 S.\Y.1099; Tatum vs. Goforth, 9 Ia. 
247, Pereau YS. Frederirk, 17 Neb. 117, 22 N.W. 235; 
In re Hylbert, 26 Fed. (2d) 672; Wolverine Oil Co. vs. 
Parks, 79 Okl. 318, 193 Pac. 624; Effenberger vs. Durant, 
37 Okla. 445, 156 Pac. 212. 
~\ppellant has failed to rite to the court so much as 
a single case which supports its view that a notary 
public or other officer is not competent to impeach his 
certificate where the person purporting to have acknowl-
edged the instrument never in fact appeared before 
him at all. There may be a few cases which support this 
position but such cases are in the minority and are not 
supported by sound reasoning or by any principle of 
public policy. 
At pages 33 and 34 of its brief, appellant advances 
three reasons in support of the rule for which it con-
tends. These reasons are as follows: 
1. That it is against public policy to permit a 
notary public to testify in impeachment of his certifi-
cate of acknowledgment. 
2. That the certificate of acknowledgment being 
the solemn declaration of an officer in his public and 
official capacity and under his hand and seal, is more 
likely to be true than the memory and testimony of the 
witness years afterwards. 
3. Persons who have dealt and :paid in reliance 
on the truth of the certificate should be protected 
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against the contradictory statements made afterwards. 
With respect to the first reason advanced, appel-
lant has not pointed out wherein it would be against 
public policy to permit the notary to testify in impeach-
ment of his certificate, except as it may be against 
public policy under the third reason. We are not un-
mindful, that persons dealing in and with property and 
parting with valuable consideration in reliance upon 
the public records should be protected to the fullest 
possible extent. However, an even higher considera-
tion of 1public policy, universally recognized by the 
courts, dictates that no person shall be deprived of his 
property rights by the connivance of forgers, thieves 
and dishonest or careless public officers. Rights in 
property may not thus be lightly swept R\Yay, even 
thoug'h bona fide purchasers for value, may be caused 
to suffer thereby. This is a case where one of two in-
nocent parties must suffer for the wrong doing of a 
third party. It is universally held that under such cir-
cumstances the one who dealt with the wrongdoer, (in 
this case the appellant,) must bear the loss. It is a 
fundamental principle of property law, too well recog-
nized to require citation of authority and subject only 
to a few exceptions not applicable here, that a person 
can convey no better title than he holds. He who pur-
chases a defective title must bear the loss. 
Contrary to appellant's contention, there are strong 
considerations of public policy in favor of permitting 
the notary to testify in impeachment of his certificate. 
The notary will in many cases be the person most con-
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versant with the facts, and therefore the one best able 
to testify with respect thereto. In many cases, as in 
the case at bar, the notary may be the only witness 
able to testify as to all of the facts surrounding the trans-
saction, and to deprive the parties of his testimony 
would require the courts to perpetuate rather than to 
correct a grievous wrong, and would result in depriv-
ing innocent owners of their property. It is settled 
law in this state that the certificate of acknowledg-
ment is only prima facie evidence of the truth of the 
facts therein stated, and the courts should not close 
their eyes and ears to any evidence which may serve 
to show the true facts and to rectify a wrong. 
The second argument advanced by the appellant 
in support of its contention that the notary should not 
be permitted to testify in impeachment of his certifi-
cate, is one addressed to the weight rather than the 
competency of the evidence. Whether or not the of-
ficer's testimony at the trial is more reliable than his 
certificate must depend upon the facts of each case. 
The factors to be considered should include the time 
elapsed from the date of the certificate to the date of 
trial; the interest, if any, of the notary public in the 
outcome of the litigation; whether or not the officer 
was a party to the wrongdoing; whether or not the of-
ficer was acquainted with the person purporting to 
have made the acknowledgment; the manner and de-
meanor of the officer upon the witness stand and all 
of the other circumstances surrounding the transaction, 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
40 
which might tend to affect the reliability or credibility 
of the testimony. 
POINT IV. 
RESPONDENTS PROVED BY A CLEAR PREPOND-
ERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE THAT THE PURPORTED 
DEED FROM LUCIE R. THOMAS TO HUGH L. THOMAS, 
JR., WAS A FORGERY AND SAID INSTRUMENT WAS 
NUGATORY AND VOID AND OF NO FORCE OR EFFECT. 
As pointed out heretofore, a certificate of acknowl-
edgment executed by a notary public, or officer, where 
no person actually appeared before him, is a nullity and 
of no force and effect. When this fact is established 
the certificate is deprived of all credibility and of all 
weight in evidence. See 1 Am J ur. 376, where it is said: 
''A grantor in an instrument of conveyance 
who never at any time appeared for the pur-
pose of acknowledging the instrument is not 
bound in any wise by the recitals in the certifi-
cate of acknowledgment attached by a notary 
public. The notary is without authority or juris-
diction to attach any certificate whatever. In 
such a case, the jurisdiction of the officer not 
having been invoked, his utterance is a nullity 
and his certifica·te has no evidentiary force: what-
ever, in favor of or against ·anyone." (Italics 
ours.) 
We again invite the Court's attention to the quo-
tations set forth under Point III in the cases of 
Louden v. Blythe, McCurley vs. Pitner, Camp vs. Car-
penter and Campbell vs. Campbell, particularly as they 
deal with the weight to be accorded a certificate of 
acknowledgment, under such circumstances. We also 
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invite the Court's attention to the following additional 
cases: 
Roach Ys. Francisco, 138 Tenn. 357, 197 S. W. 1099 
where the court said: 
"'It is unwise to lay down a fixed rule to de-
termine the weight of evidence required to over-
turn the officer's certificate. The ascertainment 
of truth is the purpose of all judicial inquiry, 
and 1ch enever the court is satisfied that the truth 
has been reached, it would be folly to .refuse to 
accept it because of some arbitrary rule respect-
the weight of evidence ... Cases may often arise, 
and if an inflexible rule as to the weight of testi-
mony required should be adopted they doubtless 
would rise, in which no one but the defendant 
landowner could testify to impeach the certifi-
cate of the notary, as in the case of a forged 
certificate. It could not be said, if the court 
were satisfied of the truth of the complainant's 
story, that he must lose his land because some 
official was willing to forge a certificate to a 
deed showing that he had conveyed it.'' (Italics 
ours.) 
The case of People vs. Geibel (Cal.) 208 Pac. (2d) 
743, was a criminal prosecution for forgery. In that 
case the evidence showed that the signature on the 
deed had not been signed by the person purporting to 
sign the same. The notary public was called as a wit-
ness and she was unable to testify as to the identity of 
the individual whose ·acknowledgment she took. (Note 
that she did not testify 1positively that the person who 
purported to have signed the instrument did not per-
sonally appear before her and acknowledge the same.) 
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The Court held in that case that the evidence was suf-
ficient to support a criminal conviction of forgery. Thus 
evidence weaker than that in the case at bar (where the 
notary testified positively that the person purporting 
to acknowledge the deed did not appear before her,) 
was held sufficient to support (i. e. to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt) a criminal conviction of forgery. 
The court said : 
"It is true, as stated by appellant, with ref-
erence to the genuiness of the signature of the 
contract, that proof of acknowledgment by a 
notary public is prima facie evidence of the 
execution of the writing, but such a showing is 
rebuttable and not conclusive. In the case at 
bar, J\lrs. Berg, the notary, could not testify to 
the identity of the individual whose acknowledg-
ment she took except that she had been intro-
duced to him as Clarence Clark by appellant. 
While she testified as to the general appearance 
of the individual, his approximate age and dress, 
there was expert testimony by handwriting ex-
perts that decedent Clark did not sign the con-
tract, and there was positive testimony that it 
was typed on a typewriter which was not in 
existence on the date of said contract. A certifi-
cate of acknowledgment being only prima facie 
evidence, such certificate may be contradicted 
by other evidence direct or indirect. Code Civ. 
Proc. sec. 1833; Moore v. Hopkins, 83 Cal. 270, 
271, 272, 23 P. 318, 17 Am. St. Rep. 248; Le 
Mesnager v. Hamilton, 101 Cal. 532, 533, 538, 
35 P. 1054, 40 Am. St. Rep. 81. Courtney v. 
Daniel et al., 124 Okl. 46, 253 P. 990, 995, 996. 
The evidence was sufficient to justify the jury 
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in concluding that notwithstanding the notarial 
acknowledgment thereon, the contract was not 
signed by Clarence Clark.'' 
In this case the trial court having heard the testi-
mony of :Jirs. Clayton and having observed her de-
meanor on the witness stand, found that Mrs. Thomas 
neYer in fact appeared before the notary. The judge 
was well justified in so finding. In fact the evidence 
would not admit of any other finding. Mrs. Clayton was 
well acquainted with ~Irs. Thomas, having known her 
for more than 15 years ; hence there would be no ques-
tion as to her recollection or to the identity of the per-
son :purporting to make the acknowledgment. Secondly, 
Mrs. Clayton had nothing personally to gain by impeach-
ing her certificate; on the contrary it must have taken 
great courage on her part to admit in open court to 
her wrong-doing in the matter. Further, by testifying 
as she did ~Irs. Clayton made damaging admissions 
against herself, and practically invited a civil ~action 
on her bond for damages by the wronged party. See 
Sec. 63-1-4 U.C.A. 1943. There is nothing in the record 
to indicate that ~Irs. Clayton had anything to gain by 
testifying as she did; r~a.ther, she testified contrary to 
her own best interest. The trial judge observed her 
demeanor on the stand and had an opportunity to de-
termine whether she was a credible witness. There is 
nothing in the record which in any way reflects dis-
credit on her testimony except the fact that without 
authority she did affix the certificate of ~acknowledg­
ment to the deed; and this appears to have been done 
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without any mala fides on her part. While it was wrong 
on her part so to do, it was not a wrong involving such 
moral turpitude on her part as to rob her testimony of 
all credibility. Her wrong was one of laxity, and not 
of fraud, deceit or malice. 
Besides the testimony of Mrs. Clayton, there is the 
uncontradicted testimony of the defendant, Hugh L. 
Thomas, Jr. (who is not a party to this appeal) that 
his n1other was not in Salt Lake City on the date that 
the deed purported to have been acknowledged, nor was 
she in Salt Lake City at any other time during 1947, 
except at around Christmas time near the end of the 
year. This testimony, coupled with the now undisputed 
fact that the signature upon the deed was not that of 
Mrs. Thomas, compels a holding that the deed was a 
forgery and was never acknowledged by Mrs. Thomas 
as her own act. Indeed there is no evidence in the rec-
ord whatsoever that would warrant any different find-
ing, and the forgery being established, it necessarily 
follows that N orthcrest obtained nothing under its deed 
from Hugh L. Thomas, Jr., except his after-acquired 
undivided one-third interest in the lands in suit. 
POINT V. 
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM TO TITLE UNDER H. H. HEMP-
STEAD IS WHOLLY WITHOUT MERIT. 
In a last desperate effort to salvage something from 
this litig·a.tion, plaintiff claims title to the west tract 
under chain of title derived from H. H. Hempstead. 
It appears that in December, 1908, Lucie Thomas, who 
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was then the undisputed owner, executed a 'Yarranty 
Deed to the \Yest tract to H. H. IIempstead of San 
Francisco, California. The deed was recorded, not at 
the request of the g-rantee, but at the request of the 
grantor. Thereafter, the grantee never exercised any 
act of dominion over the property and never in any-
wise treated it as his own. Lucie R. Thomas continued 
to treat the land as her own, mortgaging it, selling it, 
and repurchasing it, paying the taxes thereon and secur-
ing a certificate of water appropriation. In 1912, the 
land was sold by Auditor's Tax Deed to Spencer Claw-
son, who thereafter executed a Quit Claim Deed to the 
same lands to Lucie Thomas. From that date forward, 
Lucie Thomas was treated by the County as the owner 
of the land. Taxes on it were assessed in her name and 
were rpaid by her. vVhen N orthcrest became interested 
in purchasing the land in 1947, it procured a title opin-
ion from its attorneys wherein it appeared that there 
was a cloud on the title by reason of the deed to Hemp-
stead. Both Hugh L. Thomas, Jr., and N orthcrest rec-
ognized that it was only ,a cloud and it wa.s agreed that 
the cloud would be cleared as part of the agreement 
between Hugh L. Thomas, Jr., and the plaintiff. 
The present action was commenced in August of 
1950. For reasons known only to itself, N orthcrest did 
not join Lucie Hempstead, the widow of H. H. Hemp-
stead, nor the personal represent~ative of H. H. Hemp-
stead as defendants in this action. Later it commenced 
a separate quiet title action against Lucie Hempstead 
on November 7, 1950. At that time the only title which 
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N orthcrest had was whatever it obtained by virtue of 
its deeds from Hugh L. Thomas, Jr., and Utah Savings. 
It was only by virtue of these deeds that it had any 
standing ·whatsoever to commence or maintain the ac-
tion. On November 29, 1950, Northcrest obtained a 
Quit Claim Deed from Lucie Hempstead for which it 
paid the nominal consideration of $25.00. We do not 
know what representations were made to Mrs. Hemp-
stead in order to obtain the Quit Claim Deed, but at 
that time the lands covered by the Quit Claim Deed had 
a f,air market value of somewhere around $1250.00. 
After obtaining the Quit Claim Deed the attorneys 
for the a;ppellant procured the appointment of Arthur 
P. Lakin as administrator with the will annexed of 
H. H. Hempstead, deceased, and then filed ~an amended 
complaint, adding Lakin as personal representative of 
the estate of Hempstead as an additional defendant. 
Both of the defendants defaulted and N orthcrest ob-
tained a Decree quieting its title to the west tract as 
against the Hempstead interest. 
We assume that the administrator of the Hemp-
stead Estate defaulted on advice of counsel, who also 
represented N orthcrest. If, at the time the quiet title 
suit against the Hempstead interests was commenced, 
there was in fact no merit to the Hempstead claim, 
plaintiff gained nothing by virtue of the Quit Claim Deed 
from Lucie Hempstead or by virtue of its decree quieting 
title as against the Hempstead interests, and patently 
there would be no merit to its present claim to title 
under H. H. Hempstead. On the other hand, if there 
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was any merit to the Hempstead claim, it would appear 
that the personal representative of Hen1pstead was 
guilty of a gross breach of duty in failing to defend the 
quiet title suit. The net effect of this would be to per-
petrate a fraud upon both the court and upon the cred-
itors of the Estate of H. H. Hempstead. We cannot 
believe that the conduct of the appellant in this matter 
will appeal very strongly to a court of equity. Plain-
tiff either obtained nothing by virtue of its dealings 
with the Hempsteads, as above outlined, or else what-
ever it obtained was obtained by conduct which was at 
best open to severe criticism. 
(a) The Evidence Shows that Hempstead Never 
Acquired any Title by Virtue of his Deed from 
Lucie R. Thomas. 
As above indicated, Hempstead never asserted any 
claim to the west tract, nor did he ever exercise any 
act of dominion over it. This, coupled with the fact 
that Lucie Thomas continued to treat the land as her 
own, and that she paid the taxes thereon, and had al-
ways dealt with the property as her own, and the fur-
ther fact that the deed was recorded at her request and 
not a.t the request of Hempstead, who was a resident of 
San Francisco, as appears from the deed, all point very 
strongly to the fact that the deed was never delivered 
to Hempstead and there was never any intent to con-
vey title to him. Chamberlain vs. Larson, 83 Ut. 420, 
29 Pac. (2d) 335; Woolley vs. Taylor, (Ut.) 144 Pac. 
1094. 
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(b) Any Interest 'Vhich Hempstead May Have 
Acquired Under his Deed from Lucie R. Thomas 
was Extinguished by the Subsequent Sale of 
the property for Delinquent Taxes and Convey-
ance by Auditor's Tax Deed to Spencer Clawson. 
The abstract of title received in evidence shows 
that the west tract was sold for taxes and was con-
veyed to Spencer Clawson by Auditor's Tax Deed in 
the year 1912. The period of redemption expired and 
Hempstead made no effort to redeem the lands and 
Clawson thereafter Quit Claimed to Lucie R. Thomas. 
If Hempstead ever acquired any interest in the lands, 
that interest was completely extinguished by the sub-
sequent tax deed, and it follows as a necessary conse-
quence that plaintiff obtained nothing by virtue of its 
dealing with the Hempstead interests. 
POINT VI. 
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS TO TITLE UNDER H. H. HEMP-
STEAD AND UTAH SAVINGS & TRUST COMPANY WERF. 
OBTAINED IN AFFIRMATION AND NOT IN DEROGA-
TION OF THE THOMAS TITLE AND THE PLAINTIFF 
IS ESTOPPED TO CLAIM TITLE UNDER EITHER. 
The evidence is clear and undisputed that at the 
time that the plaintiff entered into its agreement with 
Hugh L. Thomas, Jr., to purchase the lands in suit, 
both of the parties to that contract recognized that there 
were outstanding clouds on the title in the form of record 
interests held by H. H. Hempstead and Utah Savings. 
Both of tile parties likewise recognized that these were 
only clouds and that they should be cleared in order to 
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giYe the purchaser good marketable title, and it was 
understood between the parties that such clouds would 
be cleared. ~-\ppellant entered into possession of the 
lands with this understanding. Thereafter, appellant 
obtained a Quit Claim Deed from Utah Savings in af-
firmation of and in accordance with its contract with 
Hugh L. Thomas, Jr. Long after this action was com-
menced, appellant further obtained a Quit Claim Deed 
from Lucie Hempstead, widow of H. H. Hempstead 
and a decree quieting its title as against Hempstead's ad-
ministrator and his widow. 
Plaintiff, having recognized the Thomas title, and 
having gone into possession under the Thomas deed is 
now estopped to assert an after acquired title as against 
the Thomas title. 
A case somewhat similar to the case at bar is Frink 
vs. Thomas, (Ore.) 25 Pac. 717, where the court said : 
"But defendant, having entered into the pos-
sission of this land under a contract of purchase, 
will not be permitted to obtain an outstanding 
title and assert it against the plaintiff. It was 
expressly understood at the time the contract for 
the sale of this land was made that the title was 
unsettled, and that ~·laintiff would take such 
steps as might be necessary, in order to perfect 
the same, so as to comply with his agreement 
with defendant. 'With this wnderstanding, defend-
ant was allowed to go into possession of the land, 
and having done so, neither equity nor good 
conscience will permit him, by taking adv·arntage 
of such possession, to obtain the title from the 
general government in his own name for l1is 
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own use and benefit. So that, if it should finally 
be determined by the land department that the 
land is not within the grant to the Oregon & 
California Railroad Company, and a patent is-
sued to defendant, the title will inure to the 
benefit of plaintiff, and the defendant would 
only be entitled to deduct from the purchase 
n1oney the actual cost of obtaining such title from 
the government. It is an established rule of 
equity 'that if a vendee 'buys up a better title 
than that of the vendor, and the vendor was 
guilty of no fraud, he can only be compelled to 
refund to the vendee the amount of money paid 
for the better title. Equity treats the purchaser 
as a trustee for his vendor, because he holds 
under him, and acts done to perfect the title of 
the former when in possession of the land inure 
to the benefit of him under whom the possession 
of the land was obtained, and through whom a 
knowledge of a defect of title was obtained. The 
vendor and vendee stand in the relation of land-
lord and tenant. The vendee cannot disavow 
the vendor's title.' Bush v. Marshall, 6 How. 
284; Galloway v. Finley, 12 Pet. 294." (Italics 
ours). 
For other cases supporting the same rule see, 
Ste!phens vs. Kesselburg, (Wash) 143 P. (2d) 289, Gar-
vey vs. LaSh ells (Cal.) 91 Pac. 498, Finch vs. Noble, 
49 Wash. 578, 96 Pac. 3, Flint v. Conner, 53 Cal. App. 
279, 200 Pac. 37, Patreski v. Minzgohr, 144 Mich. 356, 
108 N.W. 77, l\1isamore v. Berglin, 197 Ala. 111, 72 So. 
347. 
With respect to the Hempstead claim, plaintiff is 
also estopped under another principle. Plaintiff through 
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its attorneys commenced an action against the Hemp4 
steads alleging that the Hempsteads claimed an inter4 
est in the land; that the land was owned by N orthcrest 
and that the claims of the Hempsteads were null and 
Yoid and of no force and effect. On the basis of these 
allegations, and evidence in support thereof, (assumedly 
adduced), plaintiff obtained a decree quieting its title 
as against the Hempsteads. Plaintiffs having come into 
open court and having claimed and represented to the 
court, that it was the true owner of the land, and that 
the Hempstead claim was null and void, cannot come 
into the same court and represent to the court that it 
obtained a good title from the Hempsteads. If the 
Hempsteads had no title to the lands when the quiet 
title suit was commenced against them, then plaintiff 
could not have obtained any title from them. On the 
other hand, if the Hempsteads did have any title ,at the 
time of the commencement of the quiet title suit, plain-
tiff has been guilty of fraud upon the court in obtain-
ing a decree quieting its title as against the Hempsteads. 
POINT VII. 
LUCIE THOMAS ESTABLISHED A TITLE BY AD 4 
VERSE POSSESSION, GOOD AS AGAINST THE CLAIMS 
OF EITHER H. H. HEMPSTEAD OR UTAH SAVINGS & 
TRUST COMPANY. 
'1' The trial court's Finding of Fact number 20 was 
as follows: 
"That LucieR. Thomas became the owner of 
all of the said property on the 2nd day of Sep-
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tember, 1905, and from that date to the date of 
her death on or about the 5th day of July, 1948, 
she was in the exclusive possession of all of the 
same under claim of right and as the owner 
thereof and paid all taxes levied and assessed 
against said property." 
Plaintiff has made no attack upon this finding and 
there is indeed no basis for any attack. The finding is 
amply supported by the record. Particularly from the 
year 1915 it is clear that Lucie Thomas was the owner 
of all the lands in suit and as such was possessed thereof 
and that she paid all the taxes thereon until the date 
of her death. Any interests which either Hempstead 
or Utah Savings might have had by virtue of their re-
spect1ve deeds from Lucie Thomas, were extinguished 
by this. period of adverse possession. Consequently 
neither Utah Savings nor Hempstead had anything to 
convey to N orthcrest, and N orthcrest obtained nothing 
under its Quit Claim Deeds from either Lucie Hempstead 
or fron1 Utah Savings. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant seeks to establish a title by suppressing 
the facts. If the evidence adduced at the trial was 
properly received there can be no question but what 
plaintiff has no title except as to an undivided one-
third interest in the lands in suit. The evidence clearly 
establishes and the court found, that the deed from 
Lucie Thomas and her husband, Hugh, to Utah Savings 
was intended by the parties thereto as a mortgage and 
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was so treated: that the debt thereby secured \Yas fully 
paid and satisfied, and that thereafter Utah Savings 
had no interest in the land and claimed none, and so 
advised the plaintiff and haYing no interest in the land 
could conYey none; hence plaintiff acquired nothing 
under its Quit Clailn Deed from Utah Savings. 
The evidence is equally clear that the purported 
deed from Lucie R. Thomas to Hugh L. Thon1as, Jr., 
covering the lands in suit was a forgery, and that Hugh 
L. Thomas, Jr., obtained nothing thereunder. Having 
nothing, he could convey nothing to N orthcrest. After 
the date of that deed Lucie R. Thomas died and Hugh 
L. Thomas, Jr. as one of her heirs and devisees, suc-
ceeded to an undivided one-third interest in the lands 
in suit, subject however to the probate of his mother's 
estate. Under the doctrine of after acquired title, ap-
pellant acquired an undivided one-third interest in lands 
by virtue of its deed from Hugh L. Thomas, Jr., such 
interest, however, being subject to the probate of the 
estate of Lucie R. Thomas. This undivided one-third 
interest we freely :admit. 
The evidence shows that the deed fro·m Lucie R. 
Thomas to Hempstead was never delivered to Hemp-
stead and that he never acquired any interest there-
under. If any interest was acquired, it was extinguished 
by subsequent tax deed to Spencer R. Clawson who in 
turn Quit Claimed to Lucie R. Thomas. Lucie Thomas 
also established a title by adverse possession against 
both Utah Savings and H. H. Hempstead. Further 
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appellant is estopped to assert any title to said lands 
under either Utah Savings or H. H. Hempstead. 
The Judgment of the trial eourt was correct and 
should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MORETON, CHRISTENSEN & 
CHRISTENSEN 
Attorneys for Respondents. 
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